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The influence of bright light on a single-photon detector has been described in a number of recent
publications. The impact on quantum key distribution (QKD) is important, and several hacking
experiments have been tailored to fully control single-photon detectors. Special attention has been
given to avoid introducing further errors into a QKD system. We describe the design and technical
details of an apparatus which allows to attack a quantum-cryptographic connection. This device is
capable of controlling free-space and fiber-based systems and of minimizing unwanted clicks in the
system. With different control diagrams, we are able to achieve a different level of control. The
control was initially targeted to the systems using BB84 protocol, with polarization encoding and
basis switching using beamsplitters, but could be extended to other types of systems. We further
outline how to characterize the quality of active control of single-photon detectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
The optical control of avalanche photodiodes (APDs)
has been discussed recently, and was also implemented
experimentally. It allows to control passively- [1],
actively-quenched [2] and gated [3, 4] avalanche photodi-
odes. The electrical output of superconducting nanowire
single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) can also be influ-
enced [5, 6]. The high degree of control allows to intrude
into quantum key distribution (QKD) setups [7] or to
change the outcome of generic quantum optical experi-
ments such as Bell tests up to non-physical values [8]. All
experiments that rely on the detection of single photons
can be influenced. The underlying theory has been out-
lined in a number of papers [1–3]: experiments require
an electronic circuit which provides distinct control over
a number of light sources.
QKD implementations rely often on encoding the
qubits into polarization states of single photons. In this
scenario, the avalanche photo detectors can be influenced
by polarized bright laser pulses. To achieve a full level
of control, it is required to target different detectors,
which are combined into a complete polarization ana-
lyzer. For QKD experiments the so-called “faked-state”
attack has been developed [9]. In this scheme, an eaves-
dropper Eve receives approximate single photons sent out
by the legitimate sender (Alice), analyzes and saves the
measurement outcome. Immediately after, Eve sends a
tailored light pulse onwards to the legitimate receiver
(Bob). Thereby, Eve has full knowledge on the legiti-
mate connection of Alice and Bob. Since Bob’s detector
confuses the received pulse with a single-photon click,
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nothing indicates an intrusion into the key distribution
scheme. Most security proofs do not cover this intrusion
mechanism, since is acts on a classical part of single-
photon detection. The latter are represented by electrical
pulses, which we name “clicks” through the paper.
In this paper, we provide a detailed technical descrip-
tion of a universal detector control unit. This device
was used to influence the outcome of several experi-
ments [7, 8]. Several ways to characterize the fidelity
of control of a targeted system are described. The unit
can be used to launch pulses into a variety of quantum-
optical measurement setups. The system was designed
to perform the entire optical and electronic control, and
tp be compact and portable (≈ 15 kg). Therefore, the
unit can be used at different setups on-site.
II. THEORY OF OPERATION
To detect single photons, an APD is operated in Geiger
mode, biased at a voltage slightly below the breakdown
voltage with no illumination. An avalanche breakdown
happens when an electron-hole pair, which is created
by an absorbed photon, multiplies. During avalanche,
macroscopic currents flows through the APD. When
these currents exceeds a comparator threshold, an electri-
cal pulse is produced at the detector output. Afterwards,
the voltage across the APD is reduced below the break-
down voltage, to stop the avalanche [10]. This so-called
quenching can be introduced by various methods: active
quenching reduces the bias voltage, passive quenching
utilizes the finite recharge time of the device itself, and
gating the APDs reduces the voltage periodically. Dur-
ing quenching, the APD is converted into a classical lin-
ear detector, i.e., the current through the APD depends
linearly on the incident optical power [3]. After quench-
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Non-linear response from a single-
photon detector.
ing, the voltage across the APD recovers back to the bias
voltage, and the detector becomes ready for signaling the
next photon. s
In a typical single-photon detector, the click rate in-
creases linearly up to saturation (at sometimes up to sev-
eral million clicks per second) as the number of incident
photons per second is increased. If the input number of
photons is increased above saturation, the electrical re-
sponse decays quickly. Although the amount of incident
light is increased. The basic reason for this is that the
APD is no longer sensitive to single photons as in the
linear regime. Powerful illumination can suppress the
APD’s voltage below the breakdown voltage, since there
is no full recovery between individual photons. After a
certain threshold blinding power Pblind, the detector falls
completely silent, since the avalanches become too small
to exceed the comparator threshold. For an experimental
response function of a single photon counting avalanche
photo diode, please refer to Fig. 1.
Several methods have been demonstrated to launch a
click in such a “blinded” detector [1–4]. A simple method
to launch a single click is to temporarily reduce the inci-
dent light power from above Pblind to zero [1]. The de-
tector recovers some sensitivity, and interprets the sub-
sequent rise of illumination back to above Pblind as a
single-photon detection event. Another method, mostly
used in this paper, is to constantly illuminate the detec-
tor by a power above Pblind, and to apply a short much
brighter pulse. This causes an additional photocurrent
in the linear mode, which is sufficient to cross the com-
parator threshold and to produce a click [3, 7].
In addition to APDs, SNSPDs have also been used in
modern QKD setups. SNSPDs can be controlled in a very
similar way [5, 6]. Our detector control apparatus can be
easily adjusted to be applied to a QKD setup based on
SNSPDs.
One question prior to the development of the control
apparatus was whether a real detection apparatus, prac-
tically used in QKD, can be fully controlled. A typical de-
tection apparatus, known as polarization analyzer [11], is
shown in Fig. 2(a). It contains four single-photon detec-
tors, each of which detects photons with one of the four
polarization orientations [12, 13] (see inset in Fig. 2(a)).
When a faked state is sent, at a certain detector, also
the other three might click with different probabilities,
since they might receive a certain amount of light from
the control setup. The exact amount of incident power
FIG. 2. (Color online) QKD using polarization encoding, and
faked-state attack on it. The qubits are encoded into polar-
ization states of single photons (a, inset). Each of the four
polarization states is detected by one single-photon detector.
(a) The polarization analyzer can detect four different polar-
izations: horizontal (H), vertical (V), and similarly for the 45◦
tilted basis (±45◦). (b) When the detector receives a linear
input polarization, the light is distributed unequally among
the detectors. (c) Ideally, under attack the click probability
should reach 100% for each targeted detector and vanish for
untargeted detectors. (d) The implemented attack uses the
so-called faked-state scheme. In this scheme, the eavesdrop-
per (Eve) detects the photon with a device Bob′ similar to
the legitimate receiver (Bob), then sends a faked state on-
wards to the latter. The faked state can generate the identity
matrix (c) or any other matrix at Bob, at the eavesdropper’s
will. FSG, faked-state generator; BS, beamsplitter; PBS, po-
larizing beamsplitter; HWP, half-wave plate rotated at 22.5◦
angle.
on each detector depends on the incoming polarization.
To target only one detector, it is possible to send only a
distinct linear polarization, such that only one detector
sees 50% of the incoming light. In the other basis, ro-
tated by ±45◦, each of the two detectors receives 25% of
the light. The fourth detector is orthogonally oriented to
the incoming light, such that ideally, it does not receive
any light (see Fig. 2(b) for a distribution of powers).
The overall control efficiencies can be represented by a
matrix of probabilities. An ideal control method corre-
sponds to an identity matrix (Fig. 2(c)). This produces a
click with unity probability at the target detector while
keeping the other three detectors in the same row silent.
If we just send a very bright pulse below Pblind for all
the detectors, we will produce a matrix filled with 100%
for all values. This is simply because all detectors are
in the linear detection regime and will click with high
probability under illumination below Pblind.
The exact power and polarization of light sent from
the setup should be finely adjusted, in order to meet the
following requirements: to hit the correct detector, to
launch a click with (ideally) 100% efficiency, and not in-
troduce any double-clicks, such as firing an unwanted de-
3tector. Subsequently, the power has to be higher than a
certain threshold to launch a click in a blinded detector.
For low incident powers, the success rate at the target de-
tector will be lower than unity. This might be interpreted
as a virtual optical loss of the connection. A lower suc-
cess rate can always happen and is usually compensated
by the QKD setup under attack. If the incident power is
too high, an unwanted detector might be launched simul-
taneously as the targeted one, which results in a double
click at the receiver. For security reasons in QKD, this
has to be treated by replacing the double click with a ran-
dom bit value [14, 15]. Thereby, an unknown bitflip in
the resulting key string is introduced. Subsequently, the
knowledge of the eavesdropper becomes less than perfect,
hampering her ability to decode the final key. To reliably
realize the attack, the introduction of double clicks must
be strictly avoided.
The faked-state attack can be implemented, if the re-
sponse matrix is sufficiently close to an identity matrix.
The eavesdropper (Eve) analyzes the single photons sent
by the legitimate sender (Alice) and sends a tailored
light pulse onwards to the legitimate receiver (Bob) (see
Fig. 2(d)). Since Eve and Bob share the same detection
events, Eve has the full knowledge of the secret key, when
deducing valid events from public channel information.
The scheme described above allows the influence very
general quantum-optical experiments. This setup may
not only be used just to attack QKD schemes, but also
addresses several tests of Bell’s inequality [8].
We set the requirements for the device to build as fol-
lows, to be universal in the choice of the attack: The
blinding power has to be controllable to blind all detec-
tors at desired levels. Further, by applying light pulses
both before and after the desired click time, it is possible
to achieve a significant degree of control for each detector
(as will be explained in Secti n IVA). The implementa-
tion described below requires 9 lasers in total: one for
the blinding power, keeping all detectors silent, and four
times two lasers to target each detector. The device has
to be fully programmable and also fast in terms of prop-
agation delay and jitter.
III. DEVICE IMPLEMENTATION
A. Optics design
The optical design of the control apparatus is shown in
Fig. 3. It is entirely based on laser diodes as light sources.
The apparatus was built with fiber-based optics to resist
disturbances from the environment and drifts for long-
time data acquisitions. This is required for long-time
experiments. Each laser diode only produces one optical
pulse per control event, and the relative power level for
the diodes is not changed. The diodes are either on or off,
driven directly by electronic pulses. This allows for a high
driving speed and for a simple electronic driving circuit.
The details of the electronic driver are discussed later.
FPC
CLG
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Optics part of the experimental setup.
Shown are the three relevant parts, the blinding diode (BD),
the pre-pulse generator (PPG), and the click-launch genera-
tor (CLG). All devices consist of laser diodes (LD). These are
combined with laser-to-fiber couplers (LFC) with built-in tun-
able attenuator. A fiber polarization controller (FPC) allows
for control of each polarization. The fiber polarization con-
troller at the output allows for targeting an arbitrary aligned
detector of the legitimate receiver in a QKD setup. Each
of the fiber couplers is equipped with a manually-adjustable
variable attenuator, and the blinding diode is additionally
equipped with a programmable variable attenuator (ATT).
The coupling of the diodes is adapted, or variable optical
attenuators are used, to change the required power levels.
All pulses are combined by fiber beamsplitters to form a
control pattern. All laser diodes are single transverse
mode diodes and the output light of the setup can be a
mixture of differently polarized pulses.
For a certain QKD system [16–18], we chose the most
powerful available single-mode laser diode (Sanyo DL-
8141-002) at the wavelength of 808 nm. The light pro-
duced by the laser diodes is coupled into single-mode
fibers by means of a compact diode-to-fiber coupler (OZ
Optics), equipped with a built-in variable attenuator.
The light passes polarization controllers (OZ Optics) and
is combined by means of fiber beam-splitters. The fiber
polarization controllers allow for changing the relative
polarization states. For a speficic experimental configu-
ration, a fiber polarization controller at the optical out-
put allows to target an arbitrarily aligned detector.
The coupling efficiency from the diode to fiber reaches
up to 60%. Considering the losses through the fiber path
(insertion loss, connector loss and coupling loss of fiber
beamsplitters), the overall efficiency throughout the sys-
tem is about 6%. The laser diodes have a nominal output
power of 200 mW. A maximal power of 12 mW can be
achieved at the fiber output of the setup. This is orders
of magnitude higher than the specified detection range
of the single-photon detectors, and much higher than the
required blinding power for the single-photon detectors.
This allows to compensate for losses in the transmission
line to the target detector. Higher output peak-powers
can be reached by reducing the number of laser diodes
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FIG. 4. (Color online) The described faked-state generator
can be used in a variety of schemes to control single-photon
detectors. (a) We set up a free-space experiment with a send-
ing telescope (ST) and receiving telescope (RT). We limited
the acceptance angle by an optical pinhole (PH) and accep-
tance wavelength band by a 10 nm interference filter (IF). (b)
For long-distance experiments, the system was fiber-coupled
with single-mode fiber (SMF).
and fiber beamsplitters in the setup.
The overall optical design is based on the combina-
tion of nine laser diodes. A single diode, which delivers
circularly polarized light, can be used to blind all de-
tectors simultaneously. For convenience, this diode was
equipped with a digital variable attenuator (OZ Optics
DA-100). This allows for fast change of the power level
and can be used for alignment. Four diodes deliver linear
polarization from the pre-pulse generator (PPG), which
allows for an increased blinding power targeted to any
three out of the four detectors. The click-launch gener-
ator (CLG) is intended to launch the clicks in the tar-
geted detector. It is formed by another set of four laser
diodes, which deliver linear polarization. This allows for
maximum flexibility of the control pattern to target the
detectors (see Section IVA).
Initially, the experiment was carried out in the lab
with 2m free-space separation between Eve and Bob
(Fig. 4(a)). It was possible to influence the targeted
single-photon detectors in the desired way. However, for
long-distance experiments, the coupling efficiency of light
from Eve to Bob would be lower and we would need more
powerful laser diodes, which were not easily available at
the time of our study.
The main experiment was carried out via a 290m long
single-mode fiber (see Fig. 4(b)) [7]. Before the exper-
iment started, the control diagram shown in Fig. 7(c)
was obtained by a precise tuning. The experiment lasted
for about 12 h overnight. The alignment had been main-
tained and no significant drift was observed.
B. Electronics design
The electronics was designed to form faked states that
have certain sequence of light powers and polarizations,
which can be eventually field-adjustable. We call this se-
quence a control diagram. The optical pulses are formed
in response to the signal received by a copy of the legit-
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FIG. 5. Control circuit for one PPG or CLG. The design is
partly derived from Ref. 19. TS, Eve’s time-stamp unit. See
text for details.
imate receiver unit (Bob′, see Fig. 2(d)). The electronic
circuit was built to allow for different control diagrams
(different pre- and click-launch pulses) and for precise
timing. The latter is required since many QKD protocols
rely on a precise timing between the legitimate sender
and the legitimate receiver, which should be preserved
in the presence of an eavesdropper. The electronics has
to be able to compensate for different detector time de-
lays and the internal optical propagation delay in the
optics part. Further, the electronic circuit has to trigger
the internal time-stamping of the eavesdropper, which is
done by recording the click-launch pulses sent onwards
to Bob. Depending on the exact QKD protocol, it might
occur that the eavesdropper receives more clicks than can
be sent onwards.
Two similar electronic circuits were built for the PPG
and the CLG. For highest possible flexibility, these in-
cluded a programmable logic element. An external delay
generator (Highland Technology P400) was used for dif-
ferent longer time-delays, such as setting the laser pulse
lengths.
Each of these custom-built circuits (see Fig. 5) consists
of 4 independent input channels and a dedicated reset
line. The input signals from the detector have nuclear
instrumentation (NIM) logic levels, 0 and −16mA into a
50Ω load. At the input, they are converted to emitter-
coupled logic (ECL) levels, −0.9 and −1.75V by a tran-
sistor (BFR93) and a differential receiver (MC100EL16).
The resulting ECL signals are combined on a logic OR
element (MC100EL01) and launch a trigger pulse trig
for an external delay generator. Tunable delay stages
(trimmer-adjustable one-shot triggers) are used to com-
pensate different arrival timing of pulses from the dif-
ferent channels. The ECL signals are converted into
transistor-transistor logic (TTL) levels by a converter
(MC100H603), and processed by a generic array logic
(GAL) integrated circuit (GAL16V8). The GAL is pro-
grammed to produce a rising edge on the desired chan-
nel and to produce a falling edge by the reset line, trig-
gered by the external delay generator. The function of
the circuit can be easily modified by using differently
programmed GALs. The external delay generator de-
fines the output pulse width with sub-nanosecond pre-
5reset
FIG. 6. (Color online) Electronics part of the experimental
setup. Eve receives the photon and decodes it into one of
the four polarization states. The electrical pulse (“click”) is
processed by a control circuit 1, to equalize internal delays in
the system and to control the (optional) pre-pulse generator
(PPG). The output of the control circuit 1 triggers a delay
generator followed by control circuit 2 for the click-launch
generator (CLG), and also sends the clicks onwards to Eve’s
time-stamp unit TS.
cision by activating the reset line. The pulses produced
by the GAL are buffered and amplified with a comple-
mentary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) line driver
(74ACT11004), which directly drives the laser diodes via
small current-limiting resistors. The design for this con-
trol circuit was partly derived from Ref. 19.
In our experiment, one of the circuits described above
takes the input from the receiver unit Bob′, and its out-
put drives the laser diodes in the PPG (Fig. 6). The
second circuit is cascaded to the first one and receives
its input from the GAL in the first circuit. This circuit
drives the CLG. The delay generator is triggered by the
first circuit and sets both the pulse width of the PPG
and the pulse delay and width of the CLG. For record-
ing the actual faked states, the time-stamp unit TS of
the eavesdropper is attached to the output of the first
circuit. This ensures that only events that are actually
sent onwards are recorded. Since the optical design of
the PPG and the CLG is equal, it was possible to run
all control diagrams discussed in the next section with
the above described optical and electronic configuration.
Just the GAL was reprogrammed. The PPG was used
as the only source to generate pulses, for simple control
diagrams with only one optical pulse per received click,
such that it was used as a CLG.
IV. RESULTS
A. Control diagrams
The constructed device allowed for different control
schemes of single-photon detectors. Initially, it was un-
clear if an unwanted cross-talk between multiple detec-
tors on different polarizations leads to accidental clicks.
For simplicity, some of our experiments were conducted
with simple protocols (such as described in Ref. [8]). Fur-
ther refinements of the control diagram allowed to reach
higher efficiencies and to reduce the number of accidental
clicks in the case of a slight misalignment. These more
robust protocols were used in our experiment, in which
we conduct an attack on QKD that was carried out par-
tially outdoors [7]. It led to eavesdropping the entire
secret key. In total, three control diagrams have been
characterized. The protocols are described below.
a. Diagram 1: The first control diagram was pro-
posed earlier [1]. All four detectors are blinded by con-
stant illumination of mixed linear polarizations from 4
lasers. A click at the target detector is realized by intro-
ducing a temporal gap. The polarization of illumination
corresponds to the orthogonal-basis detector (only the
corresponding laser is kept on, while the other three are
switched off), see Fig. 7(a). The power is adjusted to a
level where the detectors in the conjugate basis are kept
blinded. At the end of the gap, only the target detector
recovers sensitivity and clicks when the power is restored,
while the other three remain silent. The click probability
at the target detector with a gap of 600 ns is only 52–83%
(Fig. 7(a)). This lack of efficiency is not a problem, since
the reduced efficiency would be interpreted as an addi-
tional optical loss in the QKD experiment and would be
simply reducing the bitrate. This control diagram was
employed in the study of non-physical Bell tests [8]. Since
this diagram is targeting passively-quenched APDs, the
timing relates to the recovery time of the APD response.
This time is approximately 1µs. The click efficiency is
forming a sigmoidal curve, which starts at zero for gap-
times below 300–400 ns, and which reaches up to unity,
when the gap-time is increased above microseconds. Min-
imally four laser diodes and one of the aforementioned
circuits are required for this protocol. A more powerful
control diagram is proposed below, attempting to over-
come the two disadvantages of diagram 1: low click prob-
ability and long gap-time.
b. Diagram 2: All four detectors are blinded by con-
stant illumination with circular polarization. A click
is launched at the target detector by a very bright
(mW range) polarized pulse instead of a timing gap (see
Fig. 7(b)). The power of the pulse is adjusted to not
launch the other three detectors. Some unwanted clicks
still existed in practice, as illustrated by the small off-
diagonal elements in the matrix. The main reason is
that the four detectors do not necessarily have identi-
cal optical and electrical characteristics. This diagram is
significantly more compact in time than diagram 1. The
requirements for this diagram are five laser diodes and
one control circuit.
c. Diagram 3: To eliminate unwanted clicks, a pre-
pulse polarized orthogonally in respect to the target de-
tector is introduced 100 ns before the click-launch pulse
(Fig. 7(c)). This blinds the non-target detectors deeper
and makes it more difficult to be launched by the main
pulse. The deeper blinding occurs via reducing the volt-
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Tested control diagrams. The plots show Eve’s output optical power and polarization as a function
of time. Timing of Eve’s received click is denoted as 0. The timing of click in the target detector is marked with asterisk.
The matrices show the control fidelity for the three control diagrams. The experimental complexity is increased from left to
right: (a)Diagram 1: 4 lasers selectively switched off; (b)Diagram 2: 5 lasers: 1 for blinding and 4 for click-launching pulses;
(c)Diagram 3: 9 lasers: previous plus 4 extra leasers for forming pre-pulses.
age across the APD much lower than strictly necessary
for blinding. At low voltages, the APD has smaller fi-
nite multiplication gain than when biased just below its
breakdown voltage. The off-diagonal elements in the ma-
trix are eliminated. Although the click probability at the
target detector is slightly lower than 100%, the eaves-
dropper can still get full information on the key by lis-
tening to the key sifting procedure during classical com-
munication part of the QKD protocol. This control di-
agram is the final implementation to our eavesdropper
setup. For this diagram, nine laser diodes and the full
electronic scheme as shown in Fig. 6 are required.
Further control diagrams are feasible with the pre-
sented setup. All diagrams rely on either switching off a
laser for a given detector or increasing the power signifi-
cantly. The remaining detectors see less laser power than
the targeted one. To allow for an even higher efficiency in
unfavorable conditions, it might be possible to increase
the blinding power further before an actual click-launch
event. This might be analyzed in further studies.
B. Alignment procedure
In order to achieve good control of Bob’s detectors,
polarizations and powers of Eve’s lasers have to be indi-
vidually adjusted for each particular receiving unit. The
alignment procedure is carried out as three steps: First,
the circular blinding power is adjusted. Then, the pre-
and later the click-launch pulses are aligned. To emulate
a copy of the detector unit (Bob′), a simple pulse gener-
ator at a frequency of 10 kHz was used, producing 15 ns
wide pulses similar to detector output pulses. There is a
waiting time of 100µs between consecutive pulses, which
is a relaxed condition comparing to what a real Bob′ can
output (as further discussed below).
The goal is to implement the aforementioned dia-
gram 3. For alignment of the circularly polarized blind-
ing power, the blinding diode is turned on in continuous-
wave mode. It is ensured that all APDs are blinded by
adjusting the electronic controllable attenuation. The
alignment is complicated by the unequal blinding char-
acteristics of Bob’s APDs. A better control is obtained
by distributing blinding light unevenly before them. This
can be achieved by a slightly elliptical polarization. The
polarization is adjusted by monitoring Bob’s count rates
in the linear, unsaturated regime, below Pblind. Only the
targeted detector should be launched at 100% efficiency.
This task could not be achieved with only one circularly
(or slightly elliptically) polarized blinding light. Ideally,
the blinding power is set to a reasonable level, such that
the unbalance of four APDs can be compensated most.
Then, a unity matrix can be achieved after introducing
pre-pulses. We introduce the alignment for diagram 2 de-
scribed in the following paragraphs. The blinding power
is found based on measurements of diagram 2, as shown
in Fig. 8.
It is instead required to align the click-launch pulses
right after setting the blinding power for the simpler
structured diagram 2. In Fig. 8, the blinding power is dis-
played against the peak-power of the click-launch pulse
for each of the three detectors which receive a part of
7a) b)
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Thresholds of silence and 100% click probability for diagram 2. For alignment purposes the exact
background levels and peak-powers have to be targeted to the specific detectors. The graphs show the click probability of the
targeted detector (both for 0 and 100% click probability) and the non-orthogonal detectors, which are also sensitive to the
incoming laser. The aim is to launch a click in the targeted detector with unity efficiency, while keeping all other detectors in
the blind state.
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FIG. 9. (Color online) Histogram of time delays between all coincidence polarization combinations, as measured by Alice and
Bob without Eve (a) and with Eve inserted into the line (b). The full width at half maximum (FWHM) averaged over the 16
peaks is 761 ps in the former case and 779 ps in the latter [7].
the incident power (see Fig. 2). The fourth detector does
not receive any light and will remain silent throughout
the experiment. For each of the three illuminated detec-
tors the threshold of silence (labeled as 0%) is displayed.
For the targeted detector, we also introduced a curve,
which shows when the detector is fired with unity prob-
ability (labeled as 100%). The alignment has to ensure,
that only the targeted one is launched with 100% effi-
ciency, while the others remain silent. We have to align
both the circular blinding power and the peak-power.
For both settings, there is an optimal point. The win-
dows between the power for reaching unity click efficienty
and silent other detectors should be large. This equals a
blinding power of around 10−5 W for the displayed sit-
uations. See Fig. 8(a) as an example. This ensures the
stability of the apparatus, also for slight changes in the
8optical alignment. In Fig. 8(d), the main problem of dia-
gram 2 becomes evident: there is no such window. This
is likely due to variation in individual APD’s characteris-
tics. Due to the lack of such a window, it is impossible to
reach an optimal alignment with unity click-efficiency for
the targeted detector. If we increase the click efficiency,
we will introduce cross-talk to other detectors. This can
be avoided by using pre-pulses.
After setting the blinding power, it is required to set
the pre-pulse level. These pre-pulses are used to decrease
the sensitivity against further illumination. It is impor-
tant that the pre-pulses do not launch clicks on their own.
During adjustment, the power of pre-pulses is increased
until they start launching clicks in some of the detectors.
Subsequently, their level is slightly reduced.
To generate a click in diagram 3, it is required to have
additional pulses to actually launch a click in the tar-
geted detector. These pulses were generally very pow-
erful (tens of mW) and the pulse powers were adjusted
as a final alignment step. For a 10 kHz excitation rate
with a pulse generator, the power is increased until clicks
were received on the targeted detector. The power is fur-
ther increased to reach an efficiency of unity. In most
cases with diagram 3 this is sufficient to reach a diagonal
matrix with unity click efficiency, since the power level of
blinding light and pre-pulses have already been adjusted.
A cross-talk between adjacent pulses led to slightly less
than 100% click probability in the measured matrix.
The alignment was accomplished by inserting Eve into
the fiber line before attack and manually calibrating her
polarizations and power levels to match Bob’s detector
settings. The calibration only requires that the trans-
mission on the classical channel is public, which is one
of the basic assumptions of QKD. The stability has been
proven by the fact that the alignment kept steady for
∼12 hours in an overnight experiment. To be more ro-
bust, this alignment procedure could be automated and
implemented in a non-obtrusive way when the link is con-
stantly running [9].
C. Timing analysis
The introduction of an eavesdropper into a quantum
cryptographic connection will also affect the timing be-
tween the two communicating parties. It is required that
Alice and Bob have a common clock. This is commonly
realized by an external timing reference e.g. from the
global positioning system, or by atomic clocks. In the
system under attack, the timing is servoed over the joint
detection events. These originate from the accurate tim-
ing of the entangled photons used for QKD protocol. It is
not required to have an atomic time reference for initial
negotiation [20]. In the following we will discuss tim-
ing issues between the communication partners and the
disturbance introduced by an eavesdropper.
Insertion delay of the eavesdropper is an important
change in the communication protocol. For our system,
we measured insertion delay of about 212 ns (see Fig. 9).
Its main sources are the pulse length of the required laser
pre-pulses and the electronic and optical propagation de-
lay in the system. It is possible to compensate for this
insertion delay. As a lower limit it is evident that the
detection event of Bob′ has to be long enough to trigger
an electronic circuit to drive the laser diodes. An addi-
tional delay will be introduced by the population inver-
sion build-up time of the semiconductor laser diode. For
the laser pulses, the circuit described in this paper is de-
signed to fully turn the diodes on and off. It will be faster
to drive the diode from just below the lasing threshold to
above the lasing threshold, as commonly done in telecom-
munication transmitters. We estimate a lower limit for
a delay of the eavesdropper to be within 10–30 ns. This
assumes normal off-the-shelf available electronic compo-
nents and laser diodes. It would be possible to shortcut
a part of the communication line with free-space line-of-
sight radio-frequency or an optical link for fiber based
system [9]. The propagation delay in such link is n ≈ 1.5
times shorter than in optical fiber of equal length. This
would not help in case of a free-space QKD system.
In an ideal case, all four photodiodes in the legitimate
detector unit have the same optical and electrical de-
lay, however in practice the delays are not the same and
have to be compensated in software post-processing [21].
Changes in these relative delays between different de-
tector combinations Alice–Bob are another possible sig-
nature of Eve’s presence. By careful adjustment of the
tunable delay stages in Eve’s electronics, these relative
delays were kept unchanged (as evident in Fig. 9).
Each detector has a distinct deadtime after click, dur-
ing which it is not single-photon sensitive, since the volt-
age level is below the detection threshold and the pulse-
discriminator has just fired. Besides this, the deadtime
might also be influenced by other detector channels, be-
cause of limitations of Bob’s click registration system
(cross-channel effect). The introduction of an eavesdrop-
per has varied these deadtimes (see Fig. 10). For a de-
tector unit, the pulses for different detectors have a very
short time-delay of . 100 ns. This is the lower limit,
given by the deadtime of the time-stamp unit used for
these experiments. We have artificially introduced 520 ns
deadtime, to reduce uneven responsivity of detectors re-
covering from the previous launch- and pre-pulses. For
the same detector, the deadtime is ∼ 1µs, simply intro-
duced by the recovery of the APDs responsivity to the
trigger pulse.
V. DETECTABILITY OF QKD INTRUSION
Since the apparatus is targeting QKD systems, the
question arises if such an intrusion event can be detected
by Bob, or even by Alice in the QKD communication.
The demonstrated attack is well-documented and sev-
eral countermeasures are evident. It might be possible
to obscure all countermeasures by smarter attack design.
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FIG. 10. (Color online) Deadtime of all 16 detector combina-
tions (auto-correlation and cross-correlation) with and with-
out eavesdropping.
A variety of attacks into QKD connections exist already.
By not detecting the below mentioned side-effects it can-
not be guaranteed that the connection is secure.
Since we introduce a bright-light source to blind the de-
tector efficiently, it will be possible to detect the blinding
light directly with an additional photodiode in the polar-
ization detector and only allow for single-photon count-
ing if the background light level allows for single-photon
counting. Also, the current drawn by the APD power
supply will be increased, since the diode voltage level
is constantly reduced, such that the system would draw
more current. In this sense, a simple current monitor
might be sufficient to detect this intrusion.
An eavesdropper with own pulse-shaping (a few hun-
dred ns) and electrical delay (a few hundred ns) will in-
troduce a few hundred ns delay between Alice and Bob.
Depending on the exact configuration, it can be possi-
ble to measure, e.g., the distance between the legitimate
communicating parties, and allow only for a tight ranges
of transfer delay. An eavesdropper would exceed this
bound and the connection would be regarded as insecure.
In the QKD system we attacked, the exact time syn-
chronization is servoed over the detection events. Only
for initial synchronization two external referenced clocks
were used. By carefully introducing longer and longer
delays, it might be possible to keep the connection up
and running and introduce the eavesdropper.
Relative timing between Alice and Bob has a certain
jitter. An eavesdropper should seek not to change the
present jitter too much. Eve’s FSG and the response
of the legitimate detector unit to Eve’s control consti-
tute an additional source of jitter under attack. This
jitter may or may not be smaller than detector’s intrin-
sic jitter in the single-photon detection regime. In the
case of the QKD system we tested, Bob’s jitter under
control was much lower, down to ∼ 50 ps full width at
half maximum (FWHM), than its intrinsic single-photon
detection jitter of ∼ 500 ps FWHM. (We remark that
the reduction of jitter under control has also been ob-
served in SNSPDs [6].) The system we tested had 761 ps
FWHM jitter averaged over all cross-correlations under
normal operation without the presence of the eavesdrop-
per, while with the eavesdropper it increased to 779 ps
FWHM (Fig. 9). The difference is at the lower limit of
detectability. Note that the eavesdropper might compen-
sate the increased jitter by reducing the jitter of her own
detectors.
In the above design, it is evident that the legitimate
detector unit (Bob) will not receive any double clicks on
different detectors. This is also the case for clicks that
have a very short time delay between different polariza-
tion bases. Only one pulse will be given out per detection
event and the pulse length (≈ 110 ns in case of diagram 3)
is an effective deadtime. If the QKD system used a time-
stamp unit with no or reduced inter-channel deadtime, it
would be possible to observe a modified photon statistics
in the presence of an eavesdropper. This holds especially
for entanglement-based QKD schemes, but is not an is-
sue with prepare and send schemes such as BB84 with a
low clock rate. In further versions of this apparatus, it
will be possible to trigger any photon pattern on a tar-
get detector. This requires more laser diodes and a more
sophisticated electronic.
The optical fine-tuning is conducted such that we reach
a diagonal blinding matrix with unity click efficiency. If
the eavesdropper is very close to the sending unit, the op-
tical loss between them might be very low. This would
result in a detection rate of Bob′ exceeding Bob’s usual
rate. In the actual experiment, it is required to reduce the
coupling efficiency on the incoming side of the eavesdrop-
per, such that the bitrate is matching with the situation
without an eavesdropper.
Similarly, there is a problem, if there is a slight mis-
match of detector efficiencies at the legitimate receiver.
In the attack scenario of an eavesdropper generating
faked states, any mismatch is hidden by the unity click
efficiency. Subsequently, any mismatch in eavesdropper’s
copy of the legitimate receiver unit is replicated onto
Bob’s detectors. This might introduce statistical finger-
prints, which might be evident to Alice and Bob.
The intermediate position of an eavesdropper might
also be deducted when the APD detection flashback is
analyzed. An ideal photodiode would not emit any light
when it is fired, but in realistic devices, APDs emit a
small flash, when receiving a photon and launching a
click [22]. If the receiving unit of the eavesdropper is
closer than the legitimate receiver unit, Alice might re-
ceive a flashback from Eve’s detection events. This event
will be earlier detectable than with the legitimate detec-
tor unit of Bob.
By the countermeasures mentioned above, it is rela-
tively simple to detect eavesdropping by different mea-
sures. In many implementations of QKD the counter-
measures discussed are not implemented and as a con-
sequence they may be vulnerable to the types of at-
tack demonstrated in the paper. And even if all the
above countermeasures are introduced, there might be
other ways of intruding into such systems. An alterna-
tive approach to solving detector vulnerability problems
is to employ device-independent heralded qubit ampli-
fier [23, 24] or measurement-device-independent [25, 26]
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QKD protocols. Once these have been fully implemented,
our intrusion will face strong challenges, since the secu-
rity will no longer rely on properties of single-photon de-
tectors.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have described a technical apparatus
for control of various single-photon polarization analyz-
ers, not only attacking QKD schemes, but also influenc-
ing very general quantum-optical experiments, e.g., tests
of Bell’s inequality. It was successfully used to control the
outcome of passively-quenched single-photon detectors
in several experiments [7, 8]. For polarization-encoded
qubits, such as in QKD, it was possible to target a single
detector while keeping the other detectors silent. The
design goal was to optimize the click probability to unity
and to reduce the cross-talk to the other detectors to zero.
We further discussed how an optimal alignment can be
reached, and possible side effects of the attack.
In future studies, this apparatus will allow to study
the saturation behavior and linearity of various photode-
tectors, test countermeasures to detector control attacks
and hacking-resistant QKD schemes. The photodetector
active control system developed provides power outputs
of up to ∼ 100mW for each receiver element. This pro-
vides sufficient flexibility for testing photodetectors with
a wide range of response characteristics.
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